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ABSTRACT
Grounded theories hold sensorimotor activation is critical to language processing. Such theories
have focused predominantly on the dominant senses of sight and hearing. Relatively fewer
studies have assessed mental simulation within touch, taste, and smell, even though they are
critically implicated in communication for important domains, such as health and wellbeing.
We review work that sheds light on whether perceptual activation from lesser studied
modalities contribute to meaning in language. We critically evaluate data from behavioural,
imaging, and cross-cultural studies. We conclude that evidence for sensorimotor simulation in
touch, taste, and smell is weak. Comprehending language related to these senses may
instead rely on simulation of emotion, as well as crossmodal simulation of the “higher”
senses of vision and audition. Overall, the data suggest the need for a reﬁnement of
embodiment theories, as not all sensory modalities provide equally strong evidence for
mental simulation.
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We live in a rich, multimodal world, and language is a
vehicle to convey our experiences to others. But what
is the precise relationship between language and the
senses such that we can understand each other? In
recent decades, a wealth of evidence has emerged
supporting a role for the sensorimotor systems in
language comprehension: conceptual processing
recruits (is grounded or embodied in) systems
involved in perception and action (neural reuse;
Anderson, 2010; Barsalou, 2016). The activation of
these systems during language comprehension is
referred to as “mental simulation” (e.g., Zwaan,
2003). Numerous studies provide evidence against
the idea that meaning is composed exclusively of
abstract, arbitrary, amodal symbols. It has been
shown, for example, that passively listening to words
depicting upward or downward motion (e.g., ﬂy,
dive) interferes with low-level detection of motion in
an incongruent direction (Meteyard, Zokaei, Bahrami,
& Vigliocco, 2008). Nevertheless, the extent to which
language is grounded in the senses is still hotly
debated (see Barsalou, 2016; Bedny & Caramazza,
2011; Caramazza, Anzellotti, Strnad, & Lingnau, 2014;
Louwerse, 2011; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008; Pulver-
müller, 2013).
One limitation of existing research is that it has
focused heavily on the dominant systems of vision,
audition, and action. We know, for example, that
language conveying visual properties can activate
the visual system (Martin, Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, &
Ungerleider, 1995; Pulvermuller & Hauk, 2006;
Simmons et al., 2007). Likewise, behavioural exper-
iments show that when reading words and sentences,
we visually represent the shape of the objects
depicted (Zwaan et al., 2017; Zwaan, Stanﬁeld, &
Yaxley, 2002), direction of motion (Kaschak et al.,
2005; Meteyard, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2007; Meteyard
et al., 2008; Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley, & Aveyard, 2004),
and visibility (Yaxley & Zwaan, 2007). There is similar
evidence that the motor system can be activated by
language in a somatotopic manner (Hauk, Johnsrude,
& Pulvermüller, 2004; Tettamanti et al., 2005), and that
language activates representations of actions with
speciﬁc direction (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Ruesche-
meyer, Pfeiﬀer, & Bekkering, 2010), handshape
(Wheeler & Bergen, 2010), and grasp (Tucker & Ellis,
2004; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). Although the generaliz-
ability of these ﬁndings is contested (see, e.g., Chao
& Martin, 1999; Lebois, Wilson-Mendenhall, & Barsalou,
2015; Morey, Glenberg, Kaschak, Lakens, & Zwaan,
2018; Ostarek, Joosen, Ishag, de Nijs, & Huettig,
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2019), the accumulated evidence suggests that under
the right circumstances (see Yee & Thompson-Schill,
2016) language can activate vision, audition, and
action systems, and that it can do so in a speciﬁc
and ﬁne-grained manner.
However, there is more to sensorimotor experience
than this. The perceptual system has traditionally been
portrayed as a ﬁve-sense system, which aside from
vision and audition, includes touch, taste, and smell
(the Aristotelian model, Sorabji, 1971; but see Winter,
2019, on the continuity of the senses). Of course,
there are ways to conceive of the senses other than
by appeal to canonical sense organs (i.e., perceived
by the eyes, ears, hands, mouth, or nose). At one
extreme, we could enumerate sensory modalities by
stimulus type, and thus distinguish three: light
(vision), mechanical (touch, hearing), and chemical
(smell, taste) senses. At the other end, we could base
our classiﬁcation on receptor types leading to more
than 30 distinct “senses” (O’Meara, Speed, San
Roque, & Majid, 2019). For the purposes of this
review, we merely seek to draw attention to the fact
that very little research has gone beyond the well-
trodden senses of vision and audition in order to con-
sider whether language interacts with other sensory
modalities. In particular, we ask whether language
recruits the same sensory representations as used in
the perception of touch, taste, and smell—the so-
called “lower” senses (Classen, 1997; Howes, 2003). If
these senses contribute to everyday experience,
then according to grounded theories, they should be
recruited for language comprehension too.
Historically, comparatively less was known about the
perceptual systems involved in touch, taste, and smell,
than vision and audition, making it diﬃcult to predict in
what way language would interact with these systems
precisely (see also Levinson & Majid, 2014). Earlier
studies suggested the lower senses were not as reliable.
For example, people have more diﬃculty shifting atten-
tion away from the tactile modality to another modality
than from the auditory or visual modality to a diﬀerent
modality (Spence, Nicholls, & Driver, 2001a; Spence,
Shore, & Klein, 2001b), and when people judge the dis-
tance between two points using touch they generally
underestimate, whereas judgment based on vision is
relatively accurate (Stevens, 1975; Gescheider, 1997).
Touch is also diﬃcult to deﬁne precisely, referred to
as “a rag-bag sense that scatters in many sub-senses”
(de Vignemont & Massin, 2015, p. 3).
Taste also has complexities. Here it is important to
make a distinction between taste proper and ﬂavour
(Spence, Smith, & Auvray, 2015), with ﬂavour being
the multisensory combination of taste, odour,
texture, temperature, and trigeminal sensation
(Auvray & Spence, 2008). Whether or not taste
should be considered a separate modality or a sub-
component of ﬂavour is debated (Spence et al.,
2015). It is thought to be diﬃcult to imagine tastes
(Andrade, May, Deeprose, Baugh, & Ganis, 2014), and
problems can arise when identifying them too (e.g.,
O’Mahony, Goldenberg, Stedmon, & Alford, 1979).
Our sense of smell too has been regularly underes-
timated (Classen, Howes, & Synnott, 1994); although
new evidence suggests we may be better at detecting
and discriminating odours than once thought
(Bushdid, Magnasco, Vosshall, & Keller, 2014; Majid,
Speed, Croijmans, & Arshamian, 2017; Shepherd,
2004), the consensus remains that we struggle to
identify odours, with some estimates claiming we
can correctly name less than half of the everyday
odours we encounter (Cain, 1979). This may be
because odour and language are weakly connected
in the brain (Engen, 1987; Lorig, 1999; Olofsson & Gott-
fried, 2015). Like taste, it is also comparably diﬃcult to
imagine an odour (Arshamian & Larsson, 2014),
suggesting people have diﬃculty accessing olfactory
representations in the absence of a real odour.
At the same time, the lower senses appear to be
poorly elaborated in language (Buck, 1949; Levinson
& Majid, 2014), further bolstering the idea that these
senses are not so important in modern life. Talk
about vision outstrips talk about the other senses in
everyday conversation (San Roque et al., 2015;
Winter, Perlman, & Majid, 2018), and there appear to
be few dedicated resources for depicting the qualities
of touch, taste, and smell. Take smell—in Western
languages, it is claimed we lack vocabulary to
convey our experience of odours; cf. Ackerman
(1990, p.6): “Smell is the mute sense, the one
without words”. The paucity of dedicated vocabulary
does not leave us completely mute, however. When
pressed to talk about odours, we do so in terms of
their source (e.g., it smells like cinnamon), or valence
(e.g., that smells disgusting), or we use crossmodal
metaphors (e.g., heavy; Iatropoulos et al., 2018). The
case for taste is marginally better, where cross-linguis-
tic data from across the world appear to agree on the
basic distinctions of sweet, salty, bitter, and sour
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(Chamberlain, 1903; Majid & Levinson, 2008; Myers,
1904), although confusions are made when identifying
basic tastes (O’Mahony et al., 1979), and lexical conﬂa-
tions across tastes exist (the same term being used to
describe sour and bitter, for example) (Majid & Levin-
son, 2008). Flavour language does extend beyond the
basic tastes, but this lexicon has also been described
as limited (Magee, 2009).
If we look beyond the West however, the purported
limits on language for the lower senses reveal them-
selves to be culture-bound (Majid, Burenhult, Stens-
myr, de Valk, & Hansson, 2018), supporting the idea
that language for the lower senses needs a thorough
re-examination. As an example, there are numerous
hunter-gatherer communities that possess elaborate
odour lexicons (Hombert, 1992; Majid & Burenhult,
2014; Majid & Kruspe, 2018; Majid et al., 2018;
O’Meara & Majid, 2016; Wnuk & Majid, 2014). Similarly,
taste and texture appear to be richly encoded in other
parts of the world (Backhouse, 1994; Dingemanse &
Majid, 2012; Nakagawa, 2012; Osawa & Ellen, 2014).
Such facts challenge our traditional assumptions
about the senses, and suggest the scientiﬁc commu-
nity could look quite diﬀerent if the scope of work
was widened to include cross-linguistic facts (Kem-
merer, 2019; Levinson, 2012).
More generally, an examination of the lower senses
is timely, as there is accumulating evidence for the
importance of these senses in all our lives. We rely
on the language of touch to convey our sense of
comfort or pain (e.g., Melzack, 1975), and miscommu-
nication can be harmful (Wierzbicka, 2012). Taste and
smell are crucially intertwined with our consumption
of food and drinks, which has important implications
for our health (Boesveldt & de Graaf, 2017). Nowadays,
appetite control and obesity are serious issues, and
language may play a crucial role in its management.
Smell also plays a critical role in hygiene and personal
relationships (Semin & de Groot, 2013): people desire
to smell good, and have pleasant smelling homes.
Beyond personal well-being, the language of the
lower senses is important in advertising with market-
ers eager to learn how best to use language to sell
their products (e.g., food, perfume).
In this article, our aim is to assess whether language
related to the lower senses activates corresponding
perceptual systems. We review research speciﬁcally
investigating the grounding of word meaning in
touch, taste, and smell. Before turning to the critical
evidence, we ﬁrst highlight some crucial issues in
research on grounded language.
2. Ongoing debates in grounded language
research
We see two key issues present in the grounded
language debate, and we focus on these in this
review: automaticity and speciﬁcity of mental simu-
lation. First, by automaticity we mean whether or
not mental simulations that are observed occur inevi-
tably during language comprehension, or instead arise
from other processes—such as strategic mental
imagery. Although some argue that mental simulation
and mental imagery overlap—at least in part—here
we consider how automatic the activation of the rel-
evant perceptual system is when understanding
language. For example, if perceptual systems are acti-
vated quickly and without volition during language
comprehension, we call this “mental simulation”,
whereas if perceptual systems are only activated
upon strategic, conscious deliberation, we call this
“mental imagery” (Pecher, van Dantzig, & Schiﬀerstein,
2009; Willems, Toni, Hagoort, & Casasanto, 2010;
Zwaan & Pecher, 2012; but note that mental imagery
could still be in line with weaker versions of embodi-
ment such as “secondary embodiment”, see Meteyard,
Cuadrado, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2012). Evidence for
automatic activation would include engagement of
perceptual representations during language proces-
sing at short time-scales (e.g., Hauk & Pulvermüller,
2004; Kiefer, Sim, Herrnberger, Grothe, & Hoenig,
2008; Wheatley, Weisberg, Beauchamp, & Martin,
2005), or during tasks that are unrelated to the
domain of interest, such as lexical decision, where a
judgment is made about whether an item is a real-
word or not, rather than a judgment about a speciﬁc
aspect of the word’s meaning (e.g., Meteyard et al.,
2008). In contrast, tasks that require deliberate
decision-making related to the domain of interest, or
that are at such a time scale that rumination about
the words is possible, could instead be explained as
the result of strategic mental imagery (e.g., see de la
Vega, de Filippis, Lachmair, Dudschig, & Kaup, 2012;
Lebois et al., 2015).
The second issue is speciﬁcity: at what level of detail
are sensory activations being engaged during mental
simulation? Simulations can be coarse-grained, in
which experiential details are coded in a schematic
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and abstract manner (Barsalou, 1999, 2003; Zwaan,
2003). Alternatively, simulations could be detailed, as
is seen for action language where representations of
speciﬁc eﬀectors are activated by language (Hauk
et al., 2004; Tettamanti et al., 2005), and ﬁne-grained
action dynamics are represented (Desai, Herter, Ric-
cardi, Rorden, & Fridriksson, 2015; Speed, van Dam,
Vigliocco, & Desai, 2018).
Speciﬁcity can be assessed using words or sen-
tences that vary on particular dimensions, such as
direction (e.g., Kaschak, Zwaan, Aveyard, & Yaxley,
2006; Meteyard et al., 2007), or speed of motion
(e.g., Speed et al., 2018; Speed & Vigliocco, 2014). For
example, listening to sentences describing slow
motion leads to longer mental simulations than sen-
tences describing fast motion. This suggests that
motion simulations include speciﬁc details about
speed of motion (Speed & Vigliocco, 2014).
Another way researchers have assessed speciﬁcity
is to examine whether regions of the brain activated
by language overlap with regions responsive to the
same real-world sensorimotor experience. For
example, words describing actions performed with
the body have been found to activate primary motor
cortex (Hauk et al., 2004), and words for objects with
acoustic properties have been found to activate
regions of auditory association cortex that are also
activated by real-world sounds (Kiefer et al., 2008),
suggesting a close correspondence between real-
world sensorimotor experience and language proces-
sing. Furthermore, the location of the activation can, in
principle, shed light on the nature of the mental simu-
lation. Hauk et al. (2004) found detailed simulation
with somatotopic activation of the motor system
(see also Tettamanti et al., 2005), thereby demonstrat-
ing speciﬁc eﬀectors can be represented in language
comprehension. Other work suggests more schematic
simulations: Pulvermuller and Hauk (2006) found that
words related to colour activated anterior regions of
the visual system which are thought to process
colour knowledge—rather than low-level visual infor-
mation per se—suggesting colour simulations may be
more abstracted than real-world visual perception (see
also Simmons et al., 2007).
Although the use of fMRI is prevalent as a means for
uncovering the type of representation implicated in
language comprehension, this line of work relies on
informal reverse inference—that is, inferring a particu-
lar sensory or motor process is engaged based on
patterns of activation of a speciﬁc brain region. This
can be problematic if the brain to function mapping
is multifold—i.e., the same brain region is implicated
in multiple cognitive processes—and if the region can
be activated in a non-speciﬁc manner with regards to
sensory modality (Aguirre, 2003; Poldrack, 2006;
Poldrack, 2011; Smeets et al., 2019). We will see this
limitation aﬀects the interpretation of a number of
studies investigating touch, taste, and smell. Another
general problem concerning imaging studies, also rel-
evant to our interpretation of ﬁndings here, is the wide-
spread use of small sample sizes and concomitant lack
of statistical power (Smeets et al., 2019; Turner, Paul,
Miller, & Barbey, 2018). On the one hand, small
sample sizes could mean the literature is simply not
ﬁnding existent eﬀects; on the other hand, reported
ﬁndings may be false positives. Keeping these caveats
in mind, we nevertheless review the fMRI literature in
order to take stock of the ﬁeld at this moment.
Our main goal is to assess the extent to which the
lower senses are activated automatically during
language comprehension, and to determine what
level of speciﬁcity they can be activated—if at all. It is
possible that these senses are not activated automati-
cally, since they are said to be less reliable. In addition,
any activation from language may be more schematic
than detailed as the lower senses are not as elaborated
lexically. At the same time, these senses have vital func-
tions in everyday life, so automatic and speciﬁc acti-
vation could be as critical as for sight and hearing.
To foreshadow the argument that is to follow, we
conclude that the research to date has not provided
convincing evidence that the lower senses are acti-
vated in an automatic manner. Moreover, the evi-
dence leads us to conclude that grounding in touch,
taste, and smell, may be more limited and abstracted
in comparison to vision and audition (at least in
English and related languages). We discuss the possi-
bility that understanding language for the lower
senses may, in fact, rely on grounding in other
sensory modalities or emotional experiences—what
we call “crossmodal compensation”—and conse-
quently, the particulars of the grounding of language
is heterogeneous across the senses.
3. The current review
The present paper reviews both behavioural and neu-
roimaging research with the view to establishing
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whether language related to the sense of touch, taste,
and smell, is represented (at least in part) through acti-
vation of perceptual representations of these modal-
ities. Given the paucity of vocabulary alluded to in
the introduction for these modalities—at least in
English where the majority (not all) of the experimen-
tal work has been conducted—this requires further
unpacking. In the context of this review, we examine
the meaning of words that refer to objects or experi-
ences primarily experienced through the perceptual
modalities of touch, taste, or smell. This could
include words where the sensory modality is necess-
arily encapsulated in a term’s meaning (the verbs to
taste or to smell, for example), but also language
where there is a strong association with the sensory
modalities of interest. There are adjectives that pick
out qualities related to an experience of touch, taste,
or smell (e.g., hot, sour, stinky); as well as nouns (e.g.,
sandpaper, sugar, perfume) and verbs with comparable
associations (e.g., grope, eat, breathe; Winter, 2016).
Sensory experience is relevant to all word meanings
related to perceptual experiences, but potentially to
diﬀerent degrees. For example, nouns are found to
be more multimodal than adjectives in English
(Lynott & Connell, 2009, 2013).
One method to establish the sensory associations
of words is to collect “modality exclusivity ratings”.
For example, Lynott and Connell (2009, 2013) asked
English speakers to rate adjectives and nouns for
how much a word’s referent could be experienced
through each of the ﬁve modalities of sight, hearing,
touch, taste, and smell. Having separate scales for
each perceptual modality meant that participants
did not have to categorize a word into a single
modality, so the degree to which a word was multimo-
dal could also be established. Based on such ratings,
individual words were then classiﬁed by their domi-
nant modality, as well as their “modality exclusivity”,
i.e., the extent to which the word is multimodal or
unimodal.
In addition to their utility in stimuli selection, such
ratings are informative about the role of the percep-
tual modalities in word meaning. For example, olfac-
tion and gustation are typically found to be the
weakest modalities, and vision the strongest in both
English and Dutch (Lynott & Connell, 2009, 2013;
Speed & Majid, 2017a; Winter, 2016; Winter et al.,
2018; but see Chen, Zhao, Long, Lu, & Huang, 2019,
where the auditory modality was rated lower than
the gustatory modality in Mandarin Chinese). This is
the case even when the item set is purposefully
chosen so that each of the ﬁve perceptual modalities
are well represented (Speed & Majid, 2017a). The
ratings also reveal the role of multimodal perception
in concept representation: ratings of olfaction corre-
late with those of gustation, reﬂecting their interaction
in ﬂavour perception; and ratings of touch correlate
with vision, reﬂecting how objects we physically act
on can usually also be seen (Lynott & Connell, 2009,
2013; Speed & Majid, 2017a).
So although English, and other Standard Average
European languages, may have few words that speciﬁ-
cally describe touch, taste, and smell experiences,
there are clearly many word meanings for which
these modalities are important. As mentioned pre-
viously, touch, taste, and smell experiences play a fun-
damental role in everyday life, so it is important to
understand how language for these modalities is pro-
cessed and represented. The theoretical and applied
implications are profound. To this end we assess
studies that explicitly test grounded accounts of
language related to the “lower” senses, as well as
other studies that speak to the issue but were not
explicitly designed for this purpose.
We begin with touch, possibly the most concrete of
the three modalities since it, in general, involves
contact between the body and an object. We then
move onto the chemical senses beginning with the
complex modality of taste, before tackling the more
elusive sense of smell.
4. Touch
Broadly, touch can be deﬁned as awareness of the
body in space, although it is generally acknowledged
to be a diﬃcult modality to characterize (de Vigne-
mont & Massin, 2015). As a consequence, we consider
this sense in terms of several distinct components. We
focus on a few diﬀerent topics that have been investi-
gated separately in the literature, but it behooves us to
point out that there are others just as worthy of inves-
tigation, for example, proprioception, vibration, and
kinaesthesia. Our focus here is a result of the current
state-of-the-art in the language of touch from a
grounded perspective. We focus on experiences
related to tactile sensing (e.g., roughness, hardness),
temperature (i.e., experiences of heat), pain (sensory
and aﬀective aspects of painful stimuli), and we also
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brieﬂy consider the language of interoception—
another type of sensing with the body (although not
technically a component of touch).
4.1. Tactile
Tactile-related words tend to be more iconic—i.e.,
they sound like what they mean (e.g., crisp)—than
words related to taste, smell, or even sight (Winter,
Perlman, Perry, & Lupyan, 2017). Since iconicity may
be a bridge to embodiment (Perniss & Vigliocco,
2014), tactile-related language may be strongly
related to mental simulation. Tactile simulation
during language comprehension has been demon-
strated in behavioural experiments. As mentioned in
the introduction, tactile stimuli are typically more
diﬃcult to shift attention away from than visual and
auditory stimuli (Spence et al., 2001a, 2001b). This
asymmetry appears to be reﬂected in language pro-
cessing too. Connell and Lynott (2010) gave partici-
pants words for object properties (e.g., chilly, silky),
and asked them to decide whether the word
matched a target modality (auditory, gustatory,
tactile, olfactory, visual). Responses were less accurate
for tactile judgments compared to the other modal-
ities. This eﬀect was found even when words were pre-
sented for only 17ms—ostensibly before conscious
processing—suggesting an automatic eﬀect. The fact
that tactile judgments for words were disadvantaged
in the same way that tactile judgments for perceptual
stimuli has been interpreted as evidence that the
meaning of tactile-related words includes tactile per-
ceptual representations (Connell & Lynott, 2010).
Although the results are certainly consistent with this
interpretation, the judgments required people to expli-
citly judgewhether wordsmatched the target modality,
so are likely to have activated the perceptual system
more than during typical word comprehension.
In a diﬀerent line of work exploiting a congruency
paradigm, Brunyé et al. (2012) report behavioural evi-
dence of tactile simulation during sentence compre-
hension. Participants read sentences that described a
tactile or non-tactile experience and then felt and
rated fabric samples. Sentences describing tactile
experiences were either fabric-related (e.g., Candice
tied a long silk ribbon onto each of her wrapped gifts),
or fabric-unrelated (e.g., Karen touched the grainy
sandpaper) describing either smooth, medium, or
rough textures. For tactile sentences unrelated to
fabric, all fabrics were rated rougher after rough sen-
tences and smoother following smooth sentences.
But for tactile sentences related to fabric, there was
a speciﬁc congruency eﬀect instead: after reading a
smooth sentence, fabrics were only rated smoother
if the fabric itself was smooth; and the same for
rough sentences accompanied with rough fabrics.
The results are consistent with the idea that language
can lead to tactile simulations. Since the results for
fabric-related and fabric-unrelated sentences
diﬀered, this suggests these simulations can be
broad (a general representation of smoothness) or
speciﬁc (a representation of smooth silk speciﬁcally)
depending on context. Sadly, the study cannot
speak to the automaticity of this eﬀect. It is unclear
what exactly the participants were told about the
link between the sentences and the fabric-rating
task, and whether or not they were aware of the
aims of the study. A skeptic could argue that since
the task involved texture rating, the reference to
texture in the sentences was more explicitly brought
to mind.
Instead of assessing the eﬀect of tactile-related
language on tactile judgments, Connell, Lynott, and
Dreyer (2012) tested the eﬀect of tactile stimulation
on semantic processing of tactile-related language.
Participants made size judgments (which is bigger/
smaller?) on pairs of words denoting objects (e.g.,
coin vs. frisbee) whilst receiving tactile stimulation on
their hands (or feet as a control) via vibrating cushions.
Size judgments were facilitated during hand stimu-
lation compared to foot stimulation. Crucially, this
was only found for small manipulable objects (e.g.,
coin), but not larger, non-manipulable objects (e.g.,
car). This is evidence that tactile perception is relevant
for processing the meaning of such words, and that it
can play a functional role in word meaning. Since
responses (i.e., judgments of size) were produced
vocally, the eﬀects cannot be the result of planning
a response with the implied eﬀector. As with the
studies above, however, we cannot tell whether
tactile perception is typically activated when merely
comprehending these words, or whether the results
are due to explicitly imagining the size of the depicted
objects. Moreover, because of the perceptual domi-
nance of vision (Stokes & Biggs, 2014), we would
expect visual imagery alone would be enough to
make size judgments, with tactile imagery being
unnecessary. However, the fact that we do see an
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eﬀect of tactile stimulation during a task that could be
completed using only visual imagery may suggest
then that tactile simulation did occur automatically.
Another piece of evidence concerning whether
tactile perception is involved in processing tactile
language comes from the “modality-switch paradigm”
as used by van Dantzig, Pecher, Zeelenberg, and Bar-
salou (2008). In their study, participants engaged in a
perceptual detection task where they had to decide
whether a ﬂash of light, a tone, or a vibration on the
ﬁnger occurred on the left or right. Following this, par-
ticipants made property-veriﬁcation judgments using
a foot pedal for sentences describing auditory,
visual, or tactile properties (e.g., a coin is hard).
Overall, property-veriﬁcation judgements were faster
when the preceding perceptual stimulation matched
the perceptual modality in the sentence (i.e., faster
to respond to a coin is hard after tactile stimulation
than after visual or auditory stimulation), consistent
with the claim that language recruits tactile represen-
tations for tactile-related language. However, in their
study van Dantzig and colleagues collapsed responses
across all trials (visual, auditory, and tactile), making it
impossible to ascertain whether or not the eﬀect
occurred within each speciﬁc modality. On reanalyzing
the data, we found facilitation for auditory and visual
concept-property pairs in same modality trials, but
not tactile concept-property pairs.1 In a similar study,
participants made property judgments for target
concept-property pairs (e.g., apple-green) following a
context pair from the same or diﬀerent modality
(visual, auditory, and tactile; Pecher et al., 2009).
Again, there were overall slower response times
when the property judgment followed a prime in a
diﬀerent modality. But here too upon reanalyzing
the data, the eﬀect was only apparent for a subset
of the conditions: in particular auditory concept-prop-
erty targets, but not visual or tactile targets.2 So, in
actual fact, the modality-switch paradigm does not
provide evidence in favour of tactile simulation. In
sum, the behavioural evidence to date does not
provide decisive evidence in favour of tactile percep-
tion being automatically activated during language
comprehension.
Evidence from a diﬀerent line of research, however,
suggests perceptual activations related to textural
metaphors can aﬀect behaviour, even when the meta-
phor is not explicitly used (for review see Lee, 2016),
suggesting an automatic link between texture
perception and texture metaphor. People have been
shown to negotiate more strongly and assign crimes
harsher sentences after sitting on a hard seat rather
than a soft seat (Ackerman, Nocera, & Bargh, 2010;
Schaefer et al., 2018), consistent with metaphors
such as “taking a hard line” or “being hard on
crime”. Similarly, touching a rough texture can make
social interactions appear more harsh, diﬃcult, and
adversarial than touching a smooth texture (Ackerman
et al., 2010; Schaefer, Denke, Heinze, & Rotte, 2014; cf.
“having a rough day”), and holding something heavy
rather than light can lead to judgments that things
are more important and serious (Ackerman et al.,
2010; cf. “thinking about weighty matters”). Such
metaphors can also aﬀect cognitive processes, so
sitting on a hard surface is said to improve memory
(being “rigid”) while sitting on a soft surface improves
creativity (being “ﬂexible”; Xie, Lu, Wang, & Cai, 2016).
For these studies, texture experience appears to aﬀect
cognition and behaviour even though texture is irrele-
vant for the situation.
One could criticize such experiments for being
transparent in terms of the goals of the study (e.g.,
touching something, then judging a scenario).
However, the study design relies on a between-partici-
pants manipulation; so, for example, people were not
aware that their seat was harder or softer than
another. Similarly, in Schaefer et al. (2014) people
were told they were taking part in two separate exper-
iments, and no-one reported being suspicious about a
connection between the two studies—although it is
not clear exactly how this information was probed.
The eﬀects reported also cannot be explained simply
by the inﬂuence of valence, i.e., sitting uncomfortably
makes you behave less favourably in general, as par-
ticipant ratings of valence did not predict punishment
harshness (Schaefer et al., 2018). Overall, these studies
suggest some link between tactile experience and
behaviour, but do not speak directly to the issue of
tactile simulation during language comprehension.
Taken together, then, the behavioural evidence
provides some nascent data in support of tactile acti-
vations being relevant for language processing, but
none of the studies are conclusive on their own.
Brain imaging data provides ancillary evidence. For
example, judging whether a concrete word has a
speciﬁc touch property (e.g., soft) activates the soma-
tosensory cortex (relevant for tactile object recog-
nition), as well as motor and premotor regions
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(Goldberg, Perfetti, & Schneider, 2006b). But this task
focuses on explicit judgments of texture, so we
cannot determine whether this activation is auto-
matic, or generated via strategic mental imagery. A
diﬀerent study found simply reading texture language
activates texture-selective somatosensory cortex
when it is used metaphorically (e.g., she had a rough
day) compared to literal sentences with the same
meaning (e.g., she had a bad day; Lacey, Stilla, &
Sathian, 2012). Finally, making similarity judgments
for words of clothing does not activate somatosensory
cortex, only regions associated with body parts (Gold-
berg et al., 2006b). However, in this last study, the
stimuli were not listed in the paper so it is not clear
on what dimensions the clothing words were distin-
guished. They were said to share “functional” attri-
butes, so similarity could have been judged on how
the clothing is used (e.g., on what part of the body it
is worn). As such, the texture of clothing was unlikely
to be salient for the task. This suggests that texture
representations are not automatically activated for
words referring to objects experienced through
texture, and instead their activation may be more
context-speciﬁc (see van Dam, van Dijk, Bekkering, &
Rueschemeyer, 2012).
Overall then, the majority of studies assessing
mental simulation of tactile experience leave open
the possibility that activations were caused by explicit
processes such as mental imagery, and therefore do
not provide evidence for the automaticity of linguistic
grounding. There is some evidence that tactile acti-
vation can vary in terms of speciﬁcity (Brunyé et al.,
2012), but most studies so far have grouped tactile-
related language together without probing the granu-
larity of the representations.
4.2. Temperature
Temperature features in numerous aspects of daily life,
such as food, health and comfort. The conceptualiz-
ation of temperature is said to involve a “complex
interplay between external reality, bodily experience
and evaluation” (Koptjevskaja-Tamm, 2015, p. 2).
How we communicate about temperature however
has been fairly understudied, until the compendium
of Koptjevskaja-Tamm (2015) which provides detailed
description of temperature in almost 30 languages.
From this we learn that languages diﬀer in the
number of terms they possess and how they
categorize temperature, reﬂecting in part environ-
mental contingencies of local temperatures experi-
enced across the globe, and in part cultural practices
associated with eating and medicine (Koptjevskaja-
Tamm, 2015). At the broadest level some generaliz-
ations do seem to emerge: if a language has a two-
term contrast for temperature it is likely to be cold
vs. warm, but if it has a four-term system then it will
be cold∼cool∼warm∼hot (Koptjevskaja-Tamm, 2015).
This suggests that mental simulation for temperature
would at least distinguish between cold and warm.
Intriguingly, cold and warm sensations are mediated
by diﬀerent aﬀerent ﬁbres, and in thermoception
research they are considered distinct submodalities
(Borhani, Làdavas, Fotopoulou, & Haggard, 2017).
Despite the wealth of linguistic variation to be
found in this domain, no study has assessed the
mental simulation of heat during language compre-
hension. There are, on the other hand, studies that
have examined the behavioural impact of metaphors
involving temperature (e.g., cold shoulder, warm char-
acter, see Lee, 2016). Heat and valence are associated
at a conceptual and perceptual level (e.g., warm is
positive, cold is negative; Bergman, Ho, Koizumi, Taja-
dura-Jiménez, & Kitagawa, 2015), and there have been
studies suggesting such metaphors can impact social
experiences (IJzerman & Semin, 2009; Williams &
Bargh, 2008). For example, people rate themselves as
more similar to another person (greater social proxi-
mity) when holding a warm beverage compared to a
cold beverage (IJzerman & Semin, 2009), and report
feeling more lonely after holding a cold (versus
warm or neutral) therapeutic pack (Bargh & Shalev,
2012). However, this research has been treated with
some skepticism following failures to replicate
(Chabris, Heck, Mandart, Benjamin, & Simons, 2019;
Lynott, Corker, Connell, & O’Brien, 2017, 2014;
Wortman, Donnellan, & Lucas, 2014), leading research-
ers to seek alternative paradigms to test the essential
premise of a link between physical and social warmth
(e.g., Borhani et al., 2017; Fetterman, Wilkowski, &
Robinson, 2018). Regardless, such results do not bear
directly on the present issue of grounding language
of the lower senses, and insteadmay reﬂect the associ-
ation between temperature and social experiences in
everyday experience (e.g., the warmth of maternal
attachment, the eﬀect of heat on aggression; Lynott
et al., 2017) or have a low-level physiological basis
(e.g., Borhani et al., 2017).
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From a grounded perspective then, to our knowl-
edge, no study has explored the language of tempera-
ture. However, behavioural and imaging paradigms
discussed in §4.1 related to tactile language could
easily be utilized in this arena too.
4.3. Pain
Unlike other aspects of touch, pain is not directly
about an external object, but primarily reﬂects an
awareness of one’s own body (de Vignemont, 2017),
and is entirely subjective (Bonch-Osmolovskaya,
Rakhilina, & Reznikova, 2009). Clearly there are
complex relationships between pain, temperature,
and other aspects of touch (see, e.g., Kammers, Rose,
& Haggard, 2011). Nevertheless, pain has a distinct
receptor system: some argue it is a separate sense
(see Auvray, Myin, & Spence, 2010), or even an
emotion (e.g., Craig, 2003).
Language plays a crucial role in our conceptualiz-
ation of pain, as self-report is the primary way to
assess it. Generally, it has been noted that languages
have few words speciﬁcally for pain (e.g., hurt), and
that people recruit words from other semantic
domains instead (e.g., my throat feels scratchy;
Bonch-Osmolovskaya et al., 2009; Reznikova, Rakhilina,
& Bonch-Osmolovskaya, 2012). Questionnaires have
been developed to help patients describe their pain
experience, for example the McGill Pain Questionnaire
(Melzack, 1975). Melzack (1975) posits three distinct
components of pain: sensory qualities (e.g., pounding),
emotional components (e.g., terrifying), and evaluative
components (e.g., annoying). To characterize the psy-
cholinguistic aspects of pain language, Borelli, Cre-
paldi, Porro, and Cacciari (2018) created a normed
lexicon of pain, including variables such as familiarity,
valence, and pain-relatedness. Using hierarchical clus-
tering, ratings of the pain-related words clustered on
two dimensions: variables associated with unpleasant-
ness (the aﬀective-motivational dimension) and vari-
ables associated with intensity and pain-relatedness
(the sensory-discriminative dimension).
As in other semantic domains, claims of ineﬀability
for pain do not take into consideration the crosslin-
guistic variation that is attested globally (Levinson &
Majid, 2014). It is noteworthy in this context that
there are several experimental studies of pain in
languages other than English—including Danish,
German, Chinese, and Japanese—as these languages
appear to exhibit distinct resources for talking about
pain. Like tactile-related language, the language of
pain can be iconic. For example, Japanese contains
numerous “mimetic” words for pain. Mimetic words
are a distinct grammatical class in Japanese that
“evoke a vivid at-the-scene feeling”, and native speak-
ers feel there is direct connection between the form of
the word and its meaning (Kita, 1997, p. 381). Interest-
ingly, English speakers presented with Japanese pain
mimetic words are sensitive to some of the same
meaning distinctions as native Japanese speakers
(Iwasaki, Vinson, & Vigliocco, 2007). Again, this iconi-
city may bridge pain experience and pain-related
words (Perniss & Vigliocco, 2014).
Pain-related language can aﬀect the experience of
pain, suggesting comprehension overlaps with
systems involved in pain processing. For example,
Danish participants perceived the pain intensity of a
noxious stimulus as higher after reading literal pain
sentences (e.g., Anna spilled acid on her hands – it
felt burning) compared to metaphorical pain sen-
tences (Erik’s team lost 0–4 – the defeat was burning),
and the eﬀect was stronger in chronic pain patients
than controls (Vukovic, Fardo, & Shtyrov, 2019).
However, the automaticity of this eﬀect could be ques-
tioned since explicit pain judgments were required. In
a diﬀerent study, Dillmann, Miltner, and Weiss (2000)
found that reading words associated with aﬀective
pain (e.g., terrible) and somatosensory pain (e.g.,
burning), whilst receiving a painful laser-heat stimulus,
led to larger laser-evoked brain potentials compared
to neutral words. However, Richter et al. (2014)
found both pain-related semantic primes and nega-
tive aﬀective primes increased pain ratings of
noxious electrical stimulation, indicating a general
eﬀect of valence rather than a speciﬁc eﬀect of pain
meaning.
Turning to the brain imaging data, one study with
German speakers found that pain-related words (e.g.,
excruciating) activated regions of the brain thought
to be relevant to pain both when explicitly imagining
pain associated with that word, and when counting
the number of vowels in those words in a distractor
task (Eck, Richter, Straube, Miltner, & Weiss, 2011).
This could be taken as evidence that pain language
leads to automatic and speciﬁc activation of circuits
involved in processing of real pain, but the putative
pain-relevant activations were found when comparing
pain-related words with a baseline of viewing a
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ﬁxation cross. This is potentially problematic as the
diﬀerence in activation could reﬂect numerous
alternative cognitive processes (e.g., attention).
When speciﬁcally comparing pain-related words with
negatively valenced words, activation of pain
systems in the imagination condition was stronger
for migraine patients than controls (Eck et al., 2011),
and only migraine patients showed activation in the
distractor condition, suggesting experience with pain
aﬀects simulations of pain, in line with Vukovic et al.
(2019). Before accepting this possibility, it is important
to point out that although the regions activated in
these comparisons are described as being part of
the “pain matrix”, they have also been associated
with processes involved in emotion and decision
making (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000). Criti-
cally, the brain response to real pain is complex and
encompasses aﬀective, cognitive, and sensory
systems (Peyron, Laurent, & García-Larrea, 2000),
which can make it diﬃcult to pinpoint “pain-speciﬁc”
activations in a satisfactory manner. In sum, it is
unclear then whether the activation found by Eck
and colleagues reﬂects simulation of pain, or more
general processes such as emotional processing or
decision making.
In a diﬀerent study, Gu and Han (2007) measured
brain activity whilst Chinese-speaking participants
read words or phrases related to painful actions (e.g.,
prick, hit by car) or neutral actions (e.g., walk, watch
TV), and then rated the pain intensity of the described
action or counted Chinese characters. Rating pain
intensity activated secondary somatosensory regions
and the insula which are thought to be involved in
the discrimination of pain; but no activation was
observed in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)—a
crucial part of the pain network activated by imagined
and hypnotized pain (Derbyshire, Whalley, Stenger, &
Oakley, 2004). This could mean that the experience
of pain evoked by pain-related language is less vivid
or more abstracted than real pain. Note, also, since
participants were explicitly asked to rate pain inten-
sity, we cannot conclude whether these activations
reﬂect mental simulation or mental imagery. Further-
more, when asked to do a diﬀerent task (count the
number of Chinese characters), there was no diﬀer-
ence between painful and neutral stimuli.
In contrast to Gu and Han, Osaka and colleagues
did ﬁnd activation of the ACC in response to pain
language (Osaka, Osaka, Morishita, Kondo, &
Fukuyama, 2004). In this study, Japanese participants
were given mimetic words whose sounds are highly
imitative of subjective pain (e.g., zuki-zuki; a throbbing
pain with a pulsing sensation). It is possible that the
sound-symbolism of the Japanese words boot-
strapped a more vivid simulation of pain (cf. Kita,
1997; Perniss & Vigliocco, 2014; Winter et al., 2017)
than the language used by Gu and Han. This points
to the importance of knowing the language-speciﬁc
details of the pain vocabulary being tested in each
study. On the other hand, Osaka et al. (2004) did
instruct participants to form unpleasant mental
images corresponding to the pain-words, which
suggests that the activations elicited were due to
mental imagery rather than habitual language com-
prehension per se.
Finally, Richter, Eck, Straube, Miltner, and Weiss
(2010) set out to examine whether overlaps in pain
language and the experience of real pain is due to
the relevance of pain to the stimuli, or instead to
overall negative valence or increased arousal. To do
this, in addition to pain-related words, German-speak-
ing participants were given negative, positive, and
neutral words, and asked to either imagine an associ-
ated situation, or complete a distinct distraction task
(counting vowels). In both tasks, areas of the brain
identiﬁed in previous studies as key parts of the pain
matrix (including ACC) were activated more to pain-
related words than valenced words.
Taken together there is some evidence that pain-
related language can activate pain-related systems,
and that this activation diﬀers between pain-related
language and negatively valenced language.
However, it is unclear whether these activations can
be attributed to pain, or other processes involving
emotion and decision making. The results of Richter
et al. (2010) suggest this activation occurs during auto-
matic language processing, but other studies suggest
more strategic processing is involved. Diﬀerences
between studies could rest in details of the speciﬁc
languages being tested or the particulars of the
language materials. As mentioned earlier, the studies
of Japanese (e.g., Osaka et al., 2004) have focused on
a special class of words—mimetics—which do not
exist in Standard Average European languages. It has
been claimed that this class of words is particularly
evocative of sensory experience (Kita, 1997), and so
it might well be predicted that mental simulation of
pain would be strongest in response to these. In
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contrast, Gu and Han (2007) studied a diﬀerent class of
words altogether—namely verbs and verbal phrases
(e.g., hit by a car). As well as diﬀering in grammatical
class, the studies also diﬀer in the sorts of meanings
being investigated. So, while Richter et al. (2010) and
Osaka et al. (2004) speciﬁcally examined words to
describe pain, Gu and Han (2007) investigated action
words which merely imply pain as a consequence of
the action.
Beyond the relevance for grounded theories of
language, the triggering of pain experiences by pain-
related language is important for clinical populations.
As Dillmann et al. (2000) highlight, chronic pain
suﬀerers are often presented with pain-related
language, and pre-activation of pain following this
could aﬀect pain thresholds and the overall severity
of pain. For example, chronic migraine suﬀerers
experience greater activation of systems involved in
pain when imagining pain and reading pain-related
words (Eck et al., 2011; see also Knost, Flor, Braun, &
Birbaumer, 1997; Vukovic et al., 2019; Weiss, Miltner,
& Dillmann, 2003), and depressed individuals show
enhanced brain activation and memory for pain
words (Nikendei, Dengler, Wiedemann, & Pauli,
2005). Cross-cultural diﬀerences in pain-language are
also important to consider in clinical situations,
where miscommunication—e.g., between doctor and
patient—could be harmful (Wierzbicka, 2012).
In sum, only a few studies suggest that the putative
“pain matrix” is activated automatically by pain-related
language (Eck et al., 2011; Richter et al., 2010); instead
activations are likely to be driven by explicitly thinking
about pain (Gu & Han, 2007; Osaka et al., 2004). It is not
clear what precise aspect of pain is activated—is it the
pain quality, intensity, or duration (Rowbotham, Holler,
Lloyd, & Wearden, 2012)? Nor is it clear how acti-
vations map onto the pain components proposed
for language (Borelli et al., 2018; Melzack, 1975).
4.4. Interoception
Another neglected perceptual modality, not tradition-
ally included in discussion of the senses, is interocep-
tion (see Tsakiris & De Preester, 2018). More recently it
has been proposed that systems involved in intero-
ception should also be recruited for mental simulation,
along with perception and action (van Dantzig et al.,
2008). Interoception refers to sensations in the body,
including experiences such as hunger, heartbeat,
headache, and itch. Such experiences may be more
important for abstract word meanings (e.g., hungry)
than concrete word meanings (e.g., rainy; Connell,
Lynott, & Banks, 2018; Desai, Reilly, & van Dam,
2018), and therefore present a challenge to claims
that grounded approaches to language cannot
explain abstract meanings (e.g., Dove, 2009; Mahon
& Caramazza, 2008).
Connell et al. (2018) collected modality exclusivity
ratings for over 32,000 words and included interocep-
tion as one of the perceptual modalities. Interoception
ratings were found to be particularly high for negative
emotions such as fear and sadness. Including intero-
ception ratings in a model of word recognition was
also found to explain response times over and above
the traditional ﬁve-sense model, providing evidence
that interoception is indeed an important component
in the representation of word meaning. A recent study
reported that primary interoceptive cortex (dorsal pos-
terior insular) was activated when participants ima-
gined being in a situation that involved vivid internal
sensations (Wilson-Mendenhall, Henriques, Barsalou,
& Barrett, 2019). In this study participants read para-
graphs describing a richly detailed experience and
were instructed to imagine “being there”. Crucially,
this activation was found after controlling for aﬀect.
Future studies are required to ascertain whether the
same systems are activated when participants
merely comprehend interoceptive language, rather
than actively engage in imagination.
5. Taste
When we refer to taste in everyday talk, we most often
mean “ﬂavour” according to current scientiﬁc termi-
nology. In this review, we stick to everyday parlance
for ease. As mentioned in the Introduction, taste
strongly involves retronasal olfaction—smelling via
the oral cavity during eating and drinking (the other
type of smelling in addition to via the nose—orthona-
sal olfaction). This means thatmost taste-relatedwords
are also strongly odour-related (Lynott & Connell,
2009, 2013; Speed & Majid, 2017a; Winter, 2016). Fur-
thermore, ﬂavour encompasses almost all sensory
modalities (Auvray & Spence, 2008; Shepherd, 2006),
including the visual experience of food and drink con-
sumed; the texture of it in our mouth (mouth-feel); the
temperature, etc. The multisensory nature of ﬂavour
elucidates why ﬂavour imagery is often rated as
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more vivid than odour imagery (Andrade et al., 2014;
Croijmans, Speed, Arshamian, & Majid, 2019). One
might predict, therefore, that ﬂavour-related language
is also easier to mentally simulate.
Some suggestive evidence for the importance of
taste simulation in the representation of food
language comes from a study by Papies (2013). In
this experiment, Papies used a feature-listing task to
examine the types of representations that underlie
the meaning of food words. Participants were given
labels for four attractive but unhealthy foods (vanilla
ice cream, cookies, cocktail nuts, chips) and four
neutral, but healthy foods (cucumber, apple, banana,
rice) for which they had to generate properties.
Overall, food words were given features thought to
reﬂect eating simulations: including basic tastes (e.g.,
sour), texture (e.g., soft), and temperature (e.g.,
warm); eating situations (e.g., good for dinner); and
hedonic features (e.g., tasty). Words for food that
was more tempting (attractive, but unhealthy) led to
more taste, texture, and temperature features;
whereas neutral food words were primarily given fea-
tures related to vision (e.g., red). This suggests tempt-
ing food words are represented more in terms of
actually eating the food than neutral food words.
A feature-listing task however is not the strongest
test of grounding, since there are numerous other
routes for how the features could be generated (e.g.,
word associations, amodal features; cf. Louwerse &
Connell, 2011). Although Papies (2013) does not
provide direct evidence that sensorimotor experience
forms the meaning of food words, the study is pio-
neering because it suggests that sensory experience
related to the taste and mouthfeel of food is impor-
tant—and more so for food that is more enjoyable.
To our knowledge only one other study has explored
mental simulation of taste using behavioural methods.
Using the modality-switch paradigm described earlier
(cf. van Dantzig et al., 2008), Pecher, Zeelenberg, and
Barsalou (2003) found property judgments on
concept-property pairs (e.g., LEMON-sour) were faster
following a concept-property pair in the same
modality (e.g., CRANBERRIES-tart) than concept-prop-
erty pairs from a diﬀerent modality (e.g., BLENDER-
loud). However, in this study, responses were col-
lapsed across modalities (audition, vision, taste,
smell, touch, and motor), so we do not know to
what extent the “modality-switch” eﬀect was observed
for taste-related judgments in particular (see §4.1).
Perceptual detection tasks have shown that the
primary taste cortex (the insula and frontal operculum)
can be activated in the absence of a taste stimulus
(Veldhuizen, Bender, Constable, & Small, 2007), so in
principle it might be possible for language to do so
too. Taste and ﬂavour perception can be inﬂuenced
by language, and it is possible that a grounded
account of taste language can explain this. The taste
of umami, and ﬂavour of umami-plus-vegetable-
odour is processed diﬀerently depending on
whether it is described as “rich and delicious” or
more literally as “monosodium glutamate” or “boiled
vegetable water” (Grabenhorst, Rolls, & Bilderbeck,
2008; see also Yeomans, Chambers, Blumenthal, &
Blake, 2008). This diﬀerence is observed in early corti-
cal areas that process the aﬀective value of taste and
ﬂavour (but not primary taste cortex), but also
aﬀective responses to stimuli in other modalities.
Thus, taste-related language (or language describing
the hedonic aspect of taste) may be grounded in
what are referred to as “secondary” taste areas of
the brain, although there is no evidence that these
activations are modality-speciﬁc.
As with touch, researchers have investigated
whether metaphors involving taste aﬀect behaviour—
even without explicit presentation of the metaphor.
For example, in line with the metaphor “variety is
the spice of life”, eating spicy food apparently leads
people to demonstrate greater variety in their
choices and more risk-taking (Mukherjee, Kramer, &
Kulow, 2017; Wang, Geng, Qin, & Yao, 2016). Thinking
about a romantic experience can aﬀect perceived
sweetness of tastants (Chan, Tong, Tan, & Koh, 2013),
and conversely a sweet taste can lead to more favour-
able judgments of a relationship (Ren, Tan, Arriaga, &
Chan, 2015). There also appears to be a link between
a preference for sweet tastes and prosocial behaviour
(cf. she’s a sweetie; Meier, Moeller, Riemer-Peltz, &
Robinson, 2012). Intriguingly, such metaphors diﬀer
cross-culturally. In Hebrew, spiciness is used as a meta-
phor for “intellectual competence”, while sweetness is
used for “inauthenticity”. In line with these metaphors,
Gilead, Gal, Polak, and Cholow (2015) found that spicy
tastes led to high social evaluations, whereas sweet
tastes increased judgments of inauthenticity. Similarly,
bitter in English can be used for situations involving
unfairness, but eating bitterness in Chinese refers to
endurance in the face of hardship. Xu (2017) found
that giving Chinese, but not English speakers, bitter
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tastes increased their judgements of eﬀort and motiv-
ation under a scenario with adverse circumstances.
However, there are numerous factors that could be
responsible for such behavioural eﬀects (e.g.,
valence, motivation), so these studies cannot be con-
sidered as evidence for automatic activation of taste;
and as with the temperature literature reviewed
earlier (§4.2), there are questions surrounding the
robustness of some of these ﬁndings (e.g., Ashton,
Pilkington, & Lee, 2014) thereby warranting further
investigation.
Brain imaging studies suggest that taste represen-
tations are activated for taste-related words, but on
closer inspection the ﬁndings are not unequivocal. In
Spanish participants, Barros-Loscertales et al. (2012)
found that passively reading taste-related words (con-
crete nouns, e.g., cebolla “onion”) activated primary
(insula and frontal operculum) gustatory cortices
more than words with little or no taste associations
(e.g., blusa “blouse”). Secondary regions were also acti-
vated (OFC), but since activation of the OFC is thought
to reﬂect processing of the aﬀective value of taste—
since it can also be activated by tasks related to
other sensory modalities (e.g., see Bechara et al.,
2000)—it can also be interpreted as reward processing
generally, not taste-speciﬁc reward.
Although the authors claim their ﬁndings show
semantic activation in gustatory regions without the
need of an explicit semantic task—and thereby consti-
tute evidence for an automatic eﬀect—a critical exam-
ination of the paradigm used in this study makes clear
that the task involved silently reading taste-related
words with a gap of 2 s between each word. During
passive reading participants could be deliberately ima-
gining the word referent which then leads to acti-
vation of the gustatory system (Kikuchi, Kubota,
Nisijima, Washiya, & Kato, 2005; Kobayashi, Sasabe,
Shigihara, Tanaka, & Watanabe, 2011; Si & Jiang,
2017). This may be particularly likely since taste
words were presented in a block together, making
taste a salient attribute. Results from this paradigm
cannot, therefore, deﬁnitively reveal whether these
activations are critical and automatically activated in
semantic processing.
In addition, the words used in this experiment
diﬀered on semantic ratings of vision and olfaction,
so the ﬁndings cannot be attributed solely to taste.
Along these lines, premotor brain regions were also
activated more for taste-related words, although this
probably reﬂects the act of eating itself rather than
the taste sensation. A diﬀerent study showed both
primary and secondary gustatory cortex activation
by metaphorical expressions involving taste (e.g., She
looked at him sweetly; Citron & Goldberg, 2014).
However, this fMRI paradigm still aﬀords the possi-
bility of taste imagery; although perhaps less likely
since the primary meaning of the sentence is not
related to taste.
In contrast to Barros-Loscertales et al. (2012) and
Citron and Goldberg (2014), Goldberg and colleagues
(Goldberg et al., 2006b; Goldberg, Perfetti, & Schnei-
der, 2006a) found words with taste-related properties
activated only putative secondary gustatory regions
(left orbitofrontal cortex); not primary gustatory
regions (the same has been observed with pictures
of appetizing food; Simmons, Martin, & Barsalou,
2005). The authors concluded that the regions acti-
vated were responsible for semantic knowledge of
ﬂavour, ﬂavour identity, and the reward value of
taste (Rolls, 2004), but as highlighted earlier, this “sec-
ondary” activation is not necessarily modality-speciﬁc.
Both studies involved fairly explicit tasks (property ver-
iﬁcation judgments and generating items related to a
target and then judging similarity), but in comparison
to Barros-Loscertales et al. (2012) provided less oppor-
tunity for strategic imagination of the word referents.
To deﬁnitively establish the extent of simulation in
taste language, a more systematic research pro-
gramme is required. It is known that speciﬁc task fea-
tures determine gustatory activation: for example,
imagined tastes aﬀect real taste perception when
people engage in deliberate imagery, but not when
the same task is performed in a more analytical
manner (Si & Jiang, 2017). Given such ﬁndings,
future studies could explicitly manipulate task require-
ments in order to test which processes lead to acti-
vation of gustatory cortices, with the view to
establishing the limits and possibilities of grounding
for this perceptual modality.
Overall, there is little evidence that low-level gusta-
tory systems are activated automatically during
language comprehension—the ﬁndings of Barros-Los-
certales et al. (2012) could be explained by gustatory
imagery. Other studies have found activations in
regions that process aspects of taste, such as
valence, using explicit tasks (Goldberg et al., 2006a,
2006b; but see Citron & Goldberg, 2014), although
this activation may not be taste-speciﬁc. No research
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has set out to test the speciﬁcity of taste simulation,
although the work of Papies (2013) suggests tempting
and healthy foods may be represented diﬀerently.
Given the dearth of studies even attempting to
assess the grounding of taste language, there is
ample room for future studies to contribute novel
insights in this arena. Such contributions would be
particularly welcome, given the critical importance of
food, and the various related challenges facing
humanity today—obesity, malnutrition, sustainability—
so as to harness language to eﬀect change.
6. Olfaction
As mentioned in the introduction, it has been said that
odour and language are weakly connected in the
brain. Since odours are apparently diﬃcult to name,
researchers have suggested this is because of a
neural-architectural limitation: some suggest olfactory
and language areas of the brain have inherently weak
links (e.g., Engen, 1987), others posit the neural codes
interfere with one another (Lorig, 1999), or more
recently that olfactory and language areas are too
directly connected (Olofsson & Gottfried, 2015).
According to Olofsson and Gottfried (2015), the piri-
form cortex (the primary olfactory cortex) is too
immediately connected to language regions of the
brain, which means that olfactory representations
remain coarse and unprocessed at the point of
lexical-semantic integration. Despite this suggestion,
some studies propose that language can activate
olfactory representations.
Evidence from behavioural studies not directly
designed to test grounded theories nevertheless
suggest odour-related words activate odour represen-
tations; although these studies are open to other
interpretations. For example, Olofsson, Bowman,
Khatibi, and Gottfried (2012) found that responses to
odours were facilitated when they were preceded by
a matching (e.g., lemon and lemon odour) compared
to mismatching odour label (e.g., almond and lemon
odour). The authors concluded that this facilitation
was evidence that odour labels activate “odor object
templates”. However, it is not clear whether such tem-
plates consist of low-level olfactory representations, or
have some other format instead. Facilitation could also
occur if participants silently labelled the odour upon
its presentation (i.e., a label-match facilitation). Alter-
natively, both the word and the odour may have
activated another common perceptual representation
that led to facilitation (such as colour; see §7.2 on
crossmodal compensation).
Other preliminary evidence for the possible
grounding of odour comes from a study where partici-
pants had to make a semantic judgment (“is this an
animal or not?”) about odour-related words (e.g.,
strawberries) and neutral words (e.g., buttons) in the
presence or absence of an ambient pine odour.
Responses were delayed for odour-related compared
to neutral words when the odour was present
(Boddy, Paz-Alonso, & Yee, 2016). Since olfactory rep-
resentations were irrelevant for the task, this interfer-
ence suggests olfaction might nevertheless be
automatically activated when comprehending olfac-
tory language, although we cannot ascertain at what
level of speciﬁcity. It is also not clear whether an
awareness of the ambient odour contributed to the
eﬀect observed in this initial data. This also applies
to other studies where an ambient odour was used
to explore the eﬀects of the olfactory metaphor
“something smells ﬁshy” on behaviour (Lee, Kim, &
Schwarz, 2015; Lee & Schwarz, 2012). The smell of
ﬁsh was found to induce feelings of suspicion, and
vice versa, feelings of suspicion aﬀected detection of
a ﬁshy odour (Lee & Schwarz, 2012). It is incumbent
upon future research to rule out possible demand
characteristic explanations for such eﬀects.
Further behavioural evidence fails to provide con-
clusive evidence for mental simulation of odour. As
described earlier, in a study of the modality-switch
eﬀect, where responses to same modality trials were
faster than responses to switched modality trials,
responses were collapsed across modalities, making
it unclear whether the eﬀect would be observed for
odour-language speciﬁcally (Pecher et al., 2003, §5).
Other studies have shown that the perceived pleasant-
ness of odours can be aﬀected by how they are
described (de Araujo, Rolls, Velazco, Margot, &
Cayeux, 2005; Herz, 2003; Herz & Clef, 2001), and this
is also discernible through activation of parts of the
brain that process the hedonic value of odours (de
Araujo et al., 2005). However, activation was stronger
in the presence of an odour compared to clean air
(de Araujo et al., 2005), suggesting language may
have diﬃculty aﬀecting odour activations if they are
not already active.
Using a similar fMRI paradigm as Barros-Loscertales
et al. (2012) who studied taste-related words, González
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et al. (2006) found that when Spanish participants read
odour-related words (e.g., canela “cinnamon”) the piri-
form cortex (the primary olfactory cortex) was acti-
vated. This result is unexpected given the proposal
that language poorly connects with olfaction. This
study faces the same shortcoming observed in
Barros-Loscertales et al. (2012), namely a 3 s gap
occurred between presentation of each word. In this
time frame, participants have time to actively think
about the referent of the word, so any activation
might not reﬂect online language comprehension
and mental simulation alone, but deliberative
thoughts and imagery of odour. This is in line with evi-
dence showing that olfactory mental imagery (Bensaﬁ
et al., 2003; Bensaﬁ, Sobel, & Khan, 2007), active odour
search (Zelano, Mohanty, & Gottfried, 2011), and expli-
cit recall of odour-evoked autobiographical memory
from words (Arshamian et al., 2013) activates the piri-
form cortex. So, this is all good evidence that low-level
olfactory representations can be deliberately activated
in the absence of odour stimuli, but not necessarily
automatically during language comprehension.
Finally, another possible explanation for piriform
cortex activation in the González et al. study is that
while thinking about the meaning of words, partici-
pants engaged in greater sniﬃng behaviour which
happens during odour imagery (Bensaﬁ, Pouliot, &
Sobel, 2005) and leads to piriform activation (Mainland
& Sobel, 2006; Sobel et al., 1998).
One possible account of the apparent inconsistency
between the ﬁnding that odour language is grounded
in olfaction (González et al., 2006), on the one hand,
and the putative diﬃculty of odour naming, on the
other, is that odour-related words and olfactory rep-
resentations are connected in a broad manner. So
rather than a word like cinnamon activating speciﬁc
olfactory representations related to the odour of cin-
namon, it instead activates a schematic, or coarse-
grain, olfactory representation (cf. Barsalou, 2003). In
order to test this idea, Speed and Majid (2018a) con-
ducted a behavioural experiment assessing whether
odour-related words aﬀect memory for real odours.
Participants held an odour-related word in mind
(e.g., cinnamon) whilst they smelled an odour and
made judgments about it. Subsequently memory for
the odours was tested with a recognition test. To
assess whether odour-words activate ﬁne-grained or
broad olfactory representations, the relationship
between each word and odour was manipulated:
words either matched the odour (e.g., cinnamon and
cinnamon odour), were a near-match (e.g., nutmeg
and cinnamon odour), were a mismatch but still
odour-related (e.g., garlic and cinnamon odour), or
were not related to olfaction (e.g., glitter). The same
experiment was conducted with sound-related
words and real sounds as a comparison modality.
None of the odour-related words aﬀected memory
for odours; in contrast, sound-related words that
were a match or a near-match to real sounds (e.g.,
bee or buzzer with bee sound) interfered with
memory for sounds. This suggests olfactory language
is not grounded in primary perceptual represen-
tations, even at a coarse-grain, whereas auditory
language is (e.g., Kaschak et al., 2006; Kiefer et al.,
2008).
In addition to measuring recognition memory,
Speed and Majid (2018a) also measured explicit judg-
ments of intensity, pleasantness, and familiarity for the
odours. While the odour-word relationship (i.e., match,
near-match, mismatch, neutral) did not aﬀect
memory, it did aﬀect these higher-level judgments.
Speciﬁcally, odours were rated as more intense and
pleasant when they had been paired with a match
or near-match word (e.g., cinnamon odour with cinna-
mon or nutmeg). These judgment eﬀects were not
apparent in the auditory equivalent of this exper-
iment. Taken together, this suggests that odour per-
ception and odour-related language may interact at
high levels of processing (e.g., where odour valence
is explicitly judged), but they do not at low-level per-
ception (i.e., where odour quality is represented).
Alternatively, since odours are thought to be pro-
cessed primarily in terms of valence (e.g., Yeshurun
& Sobel, 2010), it could mean instead that the
meaning of odour-language is grounded in emotion
(see §7.2).
A subsequent brain imaging study supports Speed
andMajid’s (2018a) conclusion that olfactory language
activates representations of odour valence, but not
low-level perceptual representations. Pomp et al.
(2018) conducted an experiment in German where
participants read sentences that were either olfactory
metaphors (e.g., Er kann ihn absolut nicht riechen; “He
cannot smell him at all” meaning “He cannot stand
him”), literal paraphrases (e.g., Er kann ihn absolut
nicht ausstehen; “He cannot stand him at all”), or
literal olfactory sentences (e.g., Er riecht sehr unangen-
ehm; “He smells very unpleasantly”). Both literal and
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metaphorical olfactory sentences activated secondary
olfactory regions of the brain (the orbitofrontal cortex;
OFC), possibly reﬂecting odour valence (Rolls, 2004),
but neither activated the piriform cortex. Recall that
this region of the brain is also involved in pain (Eck
et al., 2011) and taste processing (Barros-Loscertales
et al., 2012), so it cannot be deﬁned as modality-
speciﬁc. The lack of eﬀect is surprising given the
ﬁndings of González et al. (2006), where piriform acti-
vation was observed for odour-related words, and par-
ticularly so given the evidence that mental simulations
are represented more strongly for sentences than
single words (Bergen, Lindsay, Matlock, & Narayanan,
2007).
On the other hand, one could argue the discre-
pancy lies in the fact that the sentence stimuli of
Pomp et al. (2018) do not refer to speciﬁc odours
but general odour experiences (e.g., “He smells very
unpleasantly”); but this would apply to only 8 out of
35 sentences. The remaining 27 sentences explicitly
refer to an odour source (e.g.,“garlic” in Es ist schlecht
für die Karriere, wenn man immer nach Knoblauch
riecht; “It’s bad for a career, always smelling of
garlic.”). Pomp et al. (2018) suggest the lack of piriform
activation is due to the overall hedonicity of the olfac-
tory sentences—which highlight a pleasant or unplea-
sant odour experience—and therefore activate
secondary olfactory regions where odour valence is
processed. However, since valence is thought to be
the primary dimension by which odours are
encoded (Khan et al., 2007; Majid et al., 2018; Yeshurun
& Sobel, 2010; Zarzo, 2008; although see Olofsson
et al., 2012; Olofsson, Bowman, & Gottfried, 2013),
and odour language is also strongly encoded along
this dimension (Levinson & Majid, 2014; Winter,
2016; Wnuk & Majid, 2014) piriform activation ought
to be expected on a fully grounded perspective.
A recent study examined German odour-related
words in individuals with olfactory loss, as well as con-
trols, and also found no activation of primary olfactory
areas—even though participants were instructed to
prepare for the presentation of “words with smell”
(i.e., attention was directed to the olfactory dimension;
Han et al., 2019). In addition, although activation of
language-related brain areas diﬀered between
groups during word expectation, no diﬀerences were
observed during odour-word presentation. This
suggests deﬁcits in olfactory processing may not
aﬀect odour language comprehension, in direct
contrast with evidence from people with action
deﬁcits who display diﬀerential processing of action
language (e.g., Bak, O’Donovan, Xuereb, Boniface, &
Hodges, 2001; Fernandino et al., 2013). This is further
evidence that González et al. (2006) have captured
something other thanmental simulation in their study.
One ﬁnal piece of evidence that low-level olfactory
representations do not play a role in the comprehen-
sion of odour-related language comes from a patient
study. According to grounded accounts of meaning,
perceptual diﬃculties with olfaction should also lead
to diﬃculties with words related to olfaction. To the
contrary Luzzi et al. (2007) found that although
patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) were impaired
in odour discrimination and odour-picture matching
compared to control participants, they were unim-
paired for picture naming and word-picture matching
for the same concepts. Their perceptual deﬁcit did not
lead to a conceptual deﬁcit. It should be noted,
however, that only accuracy of picture naming and
word-picture matching was measured—not response
time—where conceptual deﬁcits in patients have
been observed previously (e.g., Fernandino et al.,
2013; Speed, van Dam, Hirath, Vigliocco, & Desai,
2017). More critically, picture naming and word-
picture matching can easily be completed by relying
on visual representations alone—i.e., without the
necessity of activating conceptual representations
related to odour—so it is not clear there was a
sound basis to predict a diﬀerence between the two
groups in the design above. Furthermore, when a
patient is impaired in one perceptual modality it is
not necessarily the case that they are entirely impaired
in a related conceptual task, so long as a partially
redundant modality can be utilized to perform the
task instead (Barsalou, 2016).
On the whole, then, there is no convincing evi-
dence to date that odour-related language activates
low-levels of olfactory processing in the absence of
deliberative odour imaging, supporting the idea that
odour and language are weakly connected in the
brain for comprehension, as well as production, as
has long been claimed (Engen, 1987; Lorig, 1999;
Olofsson & Gottfried, 2015)—at least for the languages
studied to date. Instead odour-related language may
activate regions that process valence (Pomp et al.,
2018; Speed & Majid, 2018a) at the level of broad
odour categories (i.e., odours that are similar such as
cinnamon and nutmeg; Speed & Majid, 2018a).
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7. Discussion
7.1. Assessing the evidence
The results reviewed here suggest that mental simu-
lation related to the lower senses may be diﬃcult,
and less common than for the “higher” senses of
vision and audition (e.g., Luzzi et al., 2007; Pecher
et al., 2003; Speed & Majid, 2018a; van Dantzig et al.,
2008). The evidence for overlap in brain activation
for sensory language and perception is tenuous at
best (e.g., Goldberg et al., 2006a, 2006b; Pomp et al.,
2018), with most studies unable to rule out the
engagement of strategic mental imagery in their
tasks. While there is stronger evidence for the acti-
vation of secondary sensory regions for taste and
smell language, such activation suggests a diﬀerent
level of speciﬁcity than activation of primary olfactory
and gustatory regions. In fact, since activations in
these regions appear to overlap for odours, tastes,
and pain, as well as other types of stimuli (Bechara
et al., 2000), it is unclear to what extent they can be
deﬁned in terms of a particular modality. Chatterjee
(2010) proposed that representations are progress-
ively “bleached” of sensorimotor content as they are
processed further from primary regions. Activation of
secondary gustatory and olfactory cortices (coding
for features such as valence) rather than primary
regions (coding for taste and odour quality) appears
to be depart from what is often seen for vision- and
audition-related language, where activation tends to
be “just anterior to” primary regions instead. This
suggests mental simulation of smell and taste includes
abstracted, schematic representations (cf. Speed &
Majid, 2018a), at least in speakers of English and
other Standard Average European languages where
these ideas have been tested. Given the scarcity of
research in this area, this conclusion certainly requires
further support before it can deﬁnitively be accepted.
In addition, we do not yet know what the conse-
quence is of a simulation that is more or less
abstracted. The phenomenology of language proces-
sing could diﬀer—for example, a story could be less
vivid when experienced as a more abstracted simu-
lation. Memory of linguistic stimuli could also be
aﬀected: low-level simulations could facilitate recall
of detail, whereas high-level simulations could facili-
tate recall of gist. This might be important in the
domain of health and marketing, where language is
used to persuade people to choose certain products
(e.g., Hanks, Just, & Brumberg, 2016; Turnwald, Boles,
& Crum, 2017). On the other hand, perhaps speciﬁcity
does not matter. If language can only activate rep-
resentations of odour and taste valence, this may
nevertheless be suﬃcient to aﬀect behaviour. Only
further research disentangling these issues can shed
light on the matter.
At present, little research has assessed the automa-
ticity of activations of the lower sensory systems. Many
studies leave open the possibility for strategic mental
imagery (Barros-Loscertales et al., 2012; González et al.,
2006; Osaka et al., 2004) or involve explicit judgments
about the modality of interest (Brunyé et al., 2012;
Connell & Lynott, 2010; Derbyshire et al., 2004; Osaka
et al., 2004). The evidence for the automatic mental
simulation of touch is perhaps stronger, with texture
regions of the brain activated when reading and
understanding texture-related sentences (Lacey
et al., 2012). In order to critically assess the automati-
city of mental simulations, future studies could focus
on the time-course of activations (e.g., Ostarek & Vig-
liocco, 2017), or use tasks less likely to elicit strategic
mental imagery and more akin to everyday language
use, such as narrative comprehension (Kurby &
Zacks, 2013; Willems & van Gerven, 2018).
7.2. Crossmodal compensation
If low-level perceptual representations in the lower
senses are not mentally simulated during language
comprehension, or simulated only at a schematic
level, perhaps language related to these senses is
not comprehended at suﬃcient depth, leaving
shallow, “good enough” representations (Ferreira,
Engelhardt, & Jones, 2009). We suggest that in such
situations “crossmodal compensation” is an option.
We do not experience objects and events in the
world through only one modality, but multiple; there-
fore conceptual representations also require access to
multimodal features (van Ackeren & Rueschemeyer,
2014; van Ackeren, Schneider, Musch, & Ruesche-
meyer, 2014). We propose that associated modalities
(which may better aﬀord mental simulation) may
scaﬀold meaning when mental simulation in a particu-
lar modality is diﬃcult. This form of mental simulation
is diﬀerent to metaphorical extension, where one
modality is used to explain a typically unrelated
modality (e.g., Lacey et al., 2012). Instead, crossmodal
compensation involves the recruitment of modalities
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or experiences highly associated with the referential
object or event, or representations in partially redun-
dant perceptual modalities, to compensate for
reduced simulation in the lower senses (Barsalou,
2016).
For odour-related language, which appears to be
absent of odour simulation (Han et al., 2019; Pomp
et al., 2018; Speed & Majid, 2018a), representations
of word meaning may rely more strongly on simu-
lation in vision to help scaﬀold meaning. Support for
this idea comes from modality ratings, where vision
is the second strongest associated modality with
odour-dominant words (Speed & Majid, 2017a). One
speciﬁc visual dimension that could be crossmodally
simulated for odour-related language is colour.
Colour may form a critical component of the
meaning of odour-related words like coﬀee or mint
because colour is integral to the real-world experience
of the referents, although odour may be more relevant
in real-world experience itself. It has been shown that
odours and colours are crossmodally associated (e.g.,
de Valk, Wnuk, Huisman, & Majid, 2017; Speed &
Majid, 2018b). Crucially, these odour-colour associ-
ations play a role in odour language, suggesting
colour is a crucial component of the semantic rep-
resentation of odour words (Speed & Majid, 2018b).
Individuals with odour-colour synaesthesia, who
have automatic colour associations when they smell
odours, were found to be better at naming odours
than matched controls. Even in individuals without
synaesthesia, consistency of odour-colour associations
predicted accuracy of odour naming. Speed and Majid
(2018b) suggest that strong associations between
odour and colour may strengthen associated odour-
related concepts. It is likely that existing fMRI studies
of odour language (i.e., González et al., 2006; Pomp
et al., 2018) were not designed in such a way to
allow detection of activation in colour regions.
However, González et al. (2006) did observe activation
within the middle occipital gyrus/lingual gyrus,
thought to be involved in visual processing (e.g.,
Macaluso, Frith, & Driver, 2000).
Temperature may also be associated with odour, as
odours can lead to temperature perception via the tri-
geminal system (e.g., the coolness of mint). There may
also be cultural beliefs that lead to odour-temperature
associations, such as the use of temperature in medi-
cine (Wnuk, de Valk, Huisman, & Majid, 2017). Similar
grounding is also likely for taste-related language, as
taste and ﬂavour are also strongly associated with
colour (see Spence, Levitan, Shankar, & Zampini,
2010), and temperature (Ho, Van Doorn, Kawabe,
Watanabe, & Spence, 2014). Although people can
make consistent associations between texture and
colour (Ludwig & Simner, 2013), colour is not found
to aﬀect texture judgments of food (Christensen,
1983).
Spatial representations relevant for speciﬁc con-
cepts may also be simulated. For example, we can
experience the taste of wine in our mouth and the
texture of sand on our skin. The relevance of space
has been investigated for concepts that are typically
experienced high or low in space. Studies show that
speed of responses to words are aﬀected by
whether they are presented in a spatially congruent
(e.g., hat in high position) or incongruent (e.g., hat in
low position) positions (e.g., Estes, Verges, & Barsalou,
2008; Ostarek & Vigliocco, 2017). Instead of vertical
space, Speed and Majid (2017a) examined mental
simulation of proximal and distal space. Touch and
the chemical senses are considered “proximal”
senses, and vision and audition “distal senses”
(Cytowic, 1995; Howes, 2003; Majid & Levinson, 2011;
San Roque et al., 2015). To assess whether near-far
space is mentally simulated, Speed and Majid
(2017a) used a lexical decision task with words pre-
sented either near (proximal space) or far (distal
space) on a screen. Responses to words strongly
related to olfaction (e.g., eucalyptus) were facilitated
in proximal space compared to words dominant in
other modalities. This implies olfactory-related con-
cepts are mentally simulated close to the body, poss-
ibly reﬂecting the act of sniﬃng or inhaling odours
(Speed & Majid, 2017a).
Although not a “modality” per se, another way that
language can be grounded is via emotional simulation
(e.g., Kousta, Vigliocco, Vinson, Andrews, & Del Campo,
2011; Vigliocco et al., 2014; Vigliocco, Meteyard,
Andrews, & Kousta, 2009). Vigliocco and colleagues
propose that emotional content plays a crucial role
in the representation of abstract concepts (in addition
to linguistic associations), whereas concrete concepts
are instead predominantly grounded in sensorimotor
simulation. This proposal could also be translated to
the current domains if one assumes that the language
of the lower senses is more abstract than language
related to vision and audition. But note that Majid
et al. (2018) ﬁnd no diﬀerence in emotional grounding
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of odours (in terms of facial expression) in speakers of
a language with concrete odour descriptors (Dutch)
and speakers of a language with abstract odour
descriptors (Jahai).
Existing evidence supports a role for emotional
simulation for taste and smell language in particular.
Olfaction and gustation are strongly tied to emotion
in the brain (Rolls, 2004; Royet, Plailly, Delon-Martin,
Kareken, & Segebarth, 2003), and valence is thought
to be the primary dimension on which odours and
ﬂavour are perceived (Khan et al., 2007; Sakamoto &
Watanabe, 2016; Yeshurun & Sobel, 2010; Zarzo,
2008). Moreover, taste- and smell-related language
often occurs in valenced contexts, such as the
phrases fragrant kiss or sweet delight (Winter, 2016).
Like abstract words then (Kousta et al., 2011),
valence may also be a crucial part of the semantic rep-
resentation of taste and smell (Majid et al., 2018). This
is supported by activation of the amygdala for taste-
and smell-related words (Barros-Loscertales et al.,
2012; González et al., 2006); although the taste
words and control words in Barros-Loscertales et al.
(2012) were matched on valence, suggesting
another explanation for the diﬀerence may be
required. Similarly, in ratings of emotion, Speed and
Majid (2017a) found no diﬀerence across visual, audi-
tory, haptic, gustatory, and olfactory dominant words
in ratings of valence, arousal, and dominance.
However, it is plausible that emotion ratings in this
context reﬂect the overall valence of the multimodal
object, rather than speciﬁc taste or smell aspects—
compare the valence of garlic the word, to the
valence of the smell and taste of garlic in a freshly
baked piece of garlic bread. We also know that it is
diﬃcult to imagine odours (Arshamian & Larsson,
2014), and therefore it may be diﬃcult to accurately
judge the valence of an odour in its absence. From
another perspective, emotion is thought to be a fun-
damental dimension of taste and smell (i.e., integral
to the perceptual experience itself; see Yeshurun &
Sobel, 2010), so emotional simulation could perhaps
be considered within-modality simulation. The same
argument can be made for pain, where some argue
pain just is an emotion (Craig, 2003).
To summarize, there are numerous ways in which
language of the lower senses could be crossmodally
grounded to compensate for reduced simulation —
via colour, space, emotion, and more. One way in
which to test this proposal is to compare activation
of the perceptual systems during real-world percep-
tion and during language comprehension. If crossmo-
dal compensation occurs, then activation within the
supporting modality should be relatively stronger
during language comprehension than in real-world
perception.
7.3. Future directions
It is possible that the sparsity of research on the lower
senses reﬂects the diﬃculty of investigating mental
simulation within these senses. As described in the
Introduction, the senses of touch, taste, and smell
are less well understood than vision and audition. Fur-
thermore, studies within these modalities often
require more elaborate equipment than a computer
and headset. Over time, with greater understanding
of these senses, we may see evidence of simulation
within the lower senses emerging. But, at this
moment, the data suggest the grounding of language
is not the same across the senses.
It is crucial for the advancement of this ﬁeld that
future studies aim to conduct more stringent tests of
the automaticity of the activation of the lower
senses—for example, by reducing the potential for
mental imagery. In addition, there are a number of
other directions for further research within this
domain. Below we describe how manipulations of
context, diﬀerences in experience—such as expertise—
and cross-cultural diﬀerences are critical arenas to
investigate the grounding of the lower senses.
7.3.1. Context
Numerous researchers have highlighted the important
role of context in mental simulation (e.g., Lebois et al.,
2015; van Dam et al., 2012; Zwaan, 2014), and this is
likely to be highly relevant in the grounding of
touch, taste, and smell. One important contextual
factor is depth of language processing. It has been
shown that mental simulations are involved in deep
levels of language processing—where meaning is
retrieved—but not during shallow levels, where only
surface-level meaning, or statistical linguistic infor-
mation, is accessed (Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010).
Mental simulations may also only be present when
the task makes particular features salient and available
(Kemmerer, 2015; Lebois et al., 2015; van Ackeren,
Casasanto, Bekkering, Hagoort, & Rueschemeyer,
2012; van Dam et al., 2012). Along these lines, de
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Araujo et al. (2005) found that language activated the
olfactory cortex to a greater extent when processing
an actual odorant than when responding to clean
air. Further work is needed to explore whether stron-
ger evidence for mental simulation of the lower
senses can be acquired for tasks encouraging deep
levels of processing. One possibility still to be explored
is whether contexts that highlight perceptually rel-
evant features elicit increased simulation of the
lower senses, including ﬁne-grained perceptual dis-
tinctions. For example, reading words like cinnamon
and nutmeg may elicit activation of primary olfactory
cortices if they are portrayed as dish ingredients on
a menu.
7.3.2. Experience
Mental simulation of the lower senses may also be
aﬀected by personal experience. This has been
observed for action language, in line with the body-
speciﬁcity hypothesis (Casasanto, 2009): handedness
(i.e., right vs. left handed) aﬀects activation of the pre-
motor cortex of the associated hemisphere in
response to action words (Willems, Hagoort, & Casa-
santo, 2010); and experienced ice-hockey players
show greater activation of the premotor cortex to sen-
tences about ice-hockey actions than novices (Beilock,
Lyons, Mattarella-Micke, Nusbaum, & Small, 2008;
Lyons et al., 2010). There is also a suggestion that
these eﬀects extend to perception too. Musicians acti-
vate parts of the auditory cortex when viewing images
of musical instruments, but laypersons do not (Hoenig
et al., 2011). In addition, there is evidence that per-
sonal experience with events and actions aﬀects the
functional connectivity between visual and motor
systems when listening to sentences describing
those experiences (Chow et al., 2015). This opens up
the possibility that greater experience with the lower
senses leads to stronger activation of the relevant per-
ceptual systems during language comprehension.
One way in which to address the eﬀect of experi-
ence on language processing is expertise. There are
numerous types of odour and taste experts, such as
sommeliers, perfumers, and chefs. Indeed, evidence
suggests olfactory expertise can aﬀect olfactory
language (Croijmans & Majid, 2015; Sezille, Fournel,
Rouby, Rinck, & Bensaﬁ, 2014), olfactory imagery
(Delon-Martin, Plailly, Fonlupt, Veyrac, & Royet, 2013),
and organization of the olfactory cortex (Delon-
Martin et al., 2013; Plailly, Delon-Martin, & Royet,
2012). Taking this evidence together, it appears
odour experts may also have stronger mental simu-
lation of olfaction, but this has yet to be empirically
demonstrated.
Other types of personal experience may also be rel-
evant, as has been shown for pain. Reuter, Werning,
Kuchinke, and Cosentino (2017) found that people
who are more sensitive to pain are likely to rate
pain-related words (e.g., syringe) as more associated
with pain than people less sensitive to pain. Similar
ﬁndings exist in clinical populations. Eck et al. (2011)
found that chronic migraine suﬀerers experienced
greater activation of pain systems to pain-related
language than controls (compared to non-pain-
related negative adjectives; see also Ritter et al.,
2016). In addition to greater activation of anterior
insula and OFC (related to aﬀective experience of
pain), migraine suﬀerers showed greater activation
of medial temporal lobe structures, which the
authors take to reﬂect more detailed and vivid
mental scenes imagined by the patients than controls
(Eck et al., 2011).
7.3.3. Cross-cultural diﬀerences
As discussed at the beginning of this review, the
language of the lower senses may be limited in
terms of the lexicon—in English and allied languages.
There are few words to describe our experiences
related to touch, taste, and smell, in comparison to
vision and audition (Levinson & Majid, 2014; San
Roque et al., 2015; Winter et al., 2018). One argument
for the lack of evidence of automatic, speciﬁc mental
simulation in the lower senses then could be that
Western languages are missing the right words.
However, there is increasing evidence that perceptual
language may diﬀer across cultures in profound ways
(Majid et al., 2018) which opens up the possibility to
test the grounding of the lower senses in communities
with a qualitatively diﬀerent vocabulary.
Olfaction is one domain where the contrast
between Western languages and lesser-studied
languages is particularly salient. Not only do hunter-
gatherer communities show higher codability for
smell than non-hunter-gatherer communities (Majid
et al., 2018; Majid & Burenhult, 2014; Majid & Kruspe,
2018), but there are also notable diﬀerences in the
speciﬁc linguistic strategies used to describe smells
across cultures (see also O’Meara & Majid, 2016;
Wnuk & Majid, 2014). So while English speakers
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default to talking about odours by referring to their
source (e.g., smells like banana), Jahai speakers—a
hunter-gatherer community residing in the Malay
Peninsula—have a dedicated lexicon of a dozen or
more words to indicate distinct smell qualities (Majid
& Burenhult, 2014): for example, haʔɛ˜t is the word
for the common smell of tiger, shrimp paste, sap of
rubber tree, as well as rotten meat; whereas pʔus is
the smell of old dwellings, mushrooms, stale food,
and some species of hornbill. Since these words
refer solely to an olfactory quality, it is expected they
would strongly activate odour representations,
similar to how Japanese pain mimetics activate pain
experiences (cf. Osaka et al., 2004).
As well as a qualitatively diﬀerent odour vocabulary,
there are other diﬀerences between these commu-
nities and modern industrialized cultures. They have
been characterized as “smell cultures” because olfac-
tion plays a strong role in day-to-day activities, as
well as belief systems and ideology (Burenhult &
Majid, 2011). Having a distinct lexicon and using
odour language more frequently, as well as thinking
about odours more in everyday life, is likely to make
mental simulation of olfaction more relevant and
necessary. It is an open question then whether cross-
cultural diﬀerences in language and culture can
aﬀect mental simulation of the lower senses. Exploring
diﬀerences across cultures may help elucidate the
boundary conditions in the grounding of the lower
senses, and more broadly reveal the potential connec-
tions between human language and perception (Majid
& Levinson, 2011).
8. Conclusion
From a grounded perspective, language related to the
senses of touch, taste, and smell has been compara-
tively neglected. Nevertheless, there are enough
studies that when considered together they begin to
paint a picture of how language for these senses is
grounded in sensorimotor experience. At ﬁrst glance,
there appears to be behavioural evidence that percep-
tual stimuli can aﬀect related conceptual processing
(e.g., Boddy et al., 2016; Connell et al., 2012); and
vice versa, that language of the lower senses can
aﬀect perception in those modalities (e.g., Brunyé
et al., 2012; Dillmann et al., 2000; Olofsson et al.,
2012). However, these studies do not rule out the
possibility that perceptual representations are being
activated by strategic processes, such as mental
imagery. Although brain imaging studies sometimes
show activation of primary (e.g., Barros-Loscertales
et al., 2012; González et al., 2006) and secondary
sensory cortices (e.g., Goldberg et al., 2006a, 2006b;
Pomp et al., 2018) to language of the lower senses, it
is not clear whether these activations reﬂect mental
simulation or mental imagery. If automatic activation
only goes as far as secondary regions, this suggests
mental simulation of the lower senses is schematic
and abstracted. In order to compensate for the lack
of detail in mental simulations for taste and smell in
particular, we suggest crossmodal compensation in
associated domains, such a colour, action, or
emotion, may be utilized to a greater extent.
Much remains to be learned about the automaticity
and speciﬁcity of mental simulation for the lower
senses. A particularly fruitful angle for future explora-
tions would be to examine in detail diﬀerent types
of experience, such as that associated with expertise
and cross-cultural variation. For now, the evidence
from brain imaging and behavioural studies suggests
the lower senses are not mentally simulated as
deeply as the “higher senses” of vision and audition,
calling for a rethink of the limits of grounded
language.
Notes
1. The interaction between modality and switch-type
(switch vs. no-switch) was marginally signiﬁcant, F(2,
148) = 2.55, p = .08, n2p = .033. Follow-up t-tests found a
diﬀerence between switch and no-switch trials for audi-
tory, t(74) = 2.34, p = .02; and visual t(74) = 2.75, p = .007
items, but not tactile ones, t(74) =−.4, p = .69. Data
kindly shared by the authors.
2. The interaction between modality and switch-type
(switch vs. no-switch) was marginally signiﬁcant, F(2,
118) = 2.43, p = .09, n2p = .040. Follow-up t-tests found a
switch cost for auditory items, t(59) = 3.17, p = .002; but
not visual t(59) = .64, p = .53 items, or tactile ones, t(59)
=−.24, p = .81. Data kindly shared by the authors.
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